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Too (Mentally) Busy to Chill: Cognitive Load and Inhibitory Cues interact to Moderate Triggered Displaced Aggression
	Triggered displaced aggression (TDA) refers to situations wherein a previous provocation primes an individual for aggressive responding, such that a subsequent, unrelated instigation induces higher levels of retaliation than would be observed in the absence of the initial provocation (Pedersen, Gonzales, & Miller, 2000). Although inhibitory information can be expected to decrease displaced aggression by signalling the potential negative consequences of acting aggressively, we predicted that cognitive load would interfere with such aggression-reducing effects. Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine how inhibitory cues and cognitive load might interact to moderate triggered displaced aggression. In the following sections, we discuss why we expected this interaction.
Displaced and Triggered Displaced Aggression
	In the classic notion of displaced aggression, an individual is provoked, is unable or unwilling to retaliate, but subsequently aggresses against an innocent target (see Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). In their meta-analysis on displaced aggression, however, Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, and Miller (2000) found that displaced aggression was more likely when the interaction between the provoked individual and the target of his or her aggression was more negative. Pedersen et al. (2000) examined this phenomenon in more detail and found that an initial (Time 1) provocation can interact with a subsequent (Time 2) provocation or trigger (the latter being a negative social interaction between the aggressor and the target) to produce a magnitude of triggered displaced aggression (TDA) that exceeds the aggression levels elicited by the sum of the aggression-inducing effects of the provocation and trigger alone. In the TDA paradigm, even a minor trigger (i.e., a mild annoyance) can elicit high levels of aggression when the aggressor has been previously provoked (Vasquez, Denson, Pedersen, Stenstrom, & Miller, 2005). In essence, the initial provocation induces aggressive priming. As a result, that person perceives the trigger as more intense and provoking (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005), which motivates a more aggressive response, as compared with that of a non-provoked individual.
Inhibitory Cues and TDA
	Inhibitory cues refer to a wide range of information that motivates individuals to stop or reduce aggressive behavior. Some of these cues may inhibit aggression by inducing pro-social feelings such as empathy (see Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010). Others may do so by signalling the potential for negative consequences for aggressive action. Baron (1973), for instance, found that suggesting to an aggressing participant that the target person might have a chance to retaliate was enough to reduce aggression, though this effect was stronger among aggressors who had not previously been provoked. Thus, not surprisingly, aggressors inhibit aggression in order to avoid becoming the targets of aggression themselves, at least when they are not highly motivated to avenge a previous instigation.
Another way inhibitory cues can reduce aggression is by activating social-presentation concerns (related to signalling potential consequences). It has been argued that people present images of themselves that maximize benefits and minimize costs or liabilities (Schlenker, 1980). Acting in ways that present a negative image of oneself has the potential to decrease the former and/or increase the latter. For instance, an individual who acts in an apparent anti-social manner may be less likely to be invited to social gatherings. One important factor in self-presentation is the degree to which one’s behavior is public. More specifically, believing that one’s behavior will be observed by others increases the motivation to better manage the impression they form of one’s image (House, 1980). That is, one is motivated to present a more positive (or less negative) image in public. Acting aggressively in the presence of others can potentially cause others to view oneself more negatively. Consequently, in the absence of a salient justification, individuals can be expected to inhibit an aggressive response when they are presented with cues that signal that others will observe their behavior. For the purpose of our study, we focused on this type of inhibitory cue and predicted that provoked and triggered participants would engage in less TDA when exposed to the inhibitory cue that others would learn about their aggressive responses.
Cognitive Load and TDA
Cognitive load is a global construct referring to the mental load imposed on an individual by a task (see Pass, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerben, 2003). High levels of cognitive load can usurp the mental resources that are available for other tasks, thereby reducing the processing of information and cognitions related to social contexts. Under cognitive load, individuals who are not strongly motivated to engage in deeper processing are more likely to employ mental processes that require fewer cognitive resources for dealing with additional tasks (Chun & Kruglanski, 2006). As a result, cognitive load can change the perceptions of, and reactions to, social situations and events (Forgas, 1995). A relevant outcome of inducing cognitive load is that contexts that induce impulsive responses are more likely to impact behavior if the factors that bring impulses under control require high levels of cognitive resources (see Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney 2003; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Situations in which individuals become motivated to aggress are examples of such contexts. Indeed, cognitive load has been shown to moderate aggression under certain conditions. Vasquez (2009), for instance, found that cognitive load increases triggered displaced aggression when the trigger was high in salience. The author argued that this occurred because the state of limited processing capacity induced by the high cognitive load allowed only the more salient information in the environment to be processed. In this case, the salient information was an instigating cue, the trigger, which motivated higher levels of retaliation in response to it.
Cognitive load may also moderate displaced aggression by interacting with inhibitory information and cognitions. Provoked and triggered individuals are likely to experience a strong impulse to aggress. Yet, this impulse can be inhibited if the aggressor becomes motivated to do so. Such motivation may be induced by exposure to cues that signal the potential for experiencing negative consequences due to acting aggressively. Participants may also inhibit aggression as a function of long-term socialization against acting aggressively by engaging in cognitive control to suppress undesirable cognitions, impulses, and actions (see Bandura, 1991; Anderson & Huesmann, 2003). Cognitive load, however, is likely to interfere with the aggression-reducing effects of inhibitory cues and cognitions in at least two ways. First, it can preclude or decrease the processing of inhibitory information at the moment an individual is exposed to them or while accessing them in memory. As a result, the aggressor may fail to access inhibitory cognitions (e.g., disapproval of aggression by friends and family), fail to notice the inhibiting information, or fail to elaborate on its full meaning. Second, for individuals who have already noticed and processed an inhibitory cue, inducing cognitive load at the moment they have an opportunity to aggress can interfere with recall or elaboration of the inhibiting information. For our purposes herein, we were interested in the latter situation.  Given the discussed effects of cognitive load on inhibiting cognitions and the processing of inhibitory information and its implications, we expected a main effect of cognitive load for individuals who are provoked and are in a state of high cognitive load at the moment they aggressed.  We additionally expected cognitive load to interact with the presence of inhibitory cues, such that the aggression-increasing effect of cognitive load would be strongest in the inhibitory cue condition. In other words, we expected that high cognitive load would disrupt the effect of inhibiting cues.
In summary, we examined the interactive effects of inhibitory cues and cognitive load on TDA. We predicted that under low cognitive load, provoked and triggered participants will express less aggression when they were presented with an inhibitory cue than when they are not presented with an inhibitory cue. Under high cognitive load, we expected a main effect, which would be qualified by a cognitive load x inhibitory cue interaction. Thus, we expected that under high cognitive load, the inhibitory cue would fail to inhibit aggression, leading instead, to higher levels of TDA than the low cognitive load/inhibitory cue condition.
Method
Participants and Design
The participants are 80 undergraduates (59 females, 21 males; mean age = 19.15 years) from a university in Southeast England who volunteered in exchange for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (cognitive load: high/low) x 2 (inhibitory cue: yes/no) between-subjects factorial design with constant Time 1 provocation and constant trigger. 
Procedure
Each participant was seated individually in a separate room.  As part of the cover story, they were told that they were partaking in an experiment that tested individual skills such as language, creativity, cognitive performance, and decision-making. They were also informed they would be working with a partner (fictitious) for the decision-making element of the study. The bogus participant subsequently became the target of aggression.
Provocation Induction
The participant’s first task was ostensibly a test of their language skills and provided the context for the provocation induction. Participants were asked to complete a set of 15 anagrams (words whose letters have been scrambled and needed to be rearranged into words again) in four minutes. After the four minutes had elapsed, the experimenter returned to collect the participant’s answers and went to another room, ostensibly to score them. The experimenter then returned to give the participant performance feedback. In a derogatory manner designed to be insulting, the participant was told that s/he had done a poor job, that normally all 15 anagrams would have to be redone, but that, frankly, it would be a waste of time. This provocation induction has successfully induced anger in previous research to (e.g., Vasquez, 2009, Vasquez et al., 2005). 
Trigger Induction
Following the provocation induction, participants undertook a second task, ostensibly to assess creativity. It provided the context for the trigger induction, which consisted of a slightly negative evaluation of the participant’s performance. Specifically, participants were asked to list six personality characteristics that would be useful for an astronaut (i.e., the “NASA task”). They were told that they would exchange their answers with the other participant in order to evaluate each other’s work. When the NASA task was completed, the experimenter ostensibly took the participant’s responses to the other participant for evaluation and gave the actual participant the work ostensibly completed by the bogus participant. Participants evaluated their partner regarding: 1) the quality of the answers; 2) the degree to which the answers made sense; and 3) the individual’s overall performance on the task. In addition, they rated their impression of the other person (e.g., how competent do you think your partner is) on a scale ranging from 1 (no good at all) to 7 (extremely good).
 After completing the evaluation, participants received a bogus evaluation of their own work, which constituted the trigger induction.  It indicated that the bogus participant rated the participant’s work as 3 or 4 on the various dimensions. In addition, the bogus participant ostensibly wrote comments stating that the participant’s performance was not great and could have been better.
Following the trigger induction, the participant engaged in a bogus decision-making exercise. This was the context for the aggression measure. The participant was told that the next task would measure decision-making processes during mental activity, while under conditions of distraction. The participant was also told that their partner was randomly assigned to a tactile distraction condition, which consisted of holding one’s hand in very cold water. The participant would decide how long the bogus participant should hold their hand in painfully cold water. Longer recommendations indicated higher levels of aggression. In order to ensure that the participant was aware of how painful the cold water was, they were asked to immerse a hand in it for a few seconds. To reduce the possibility that participants would inhibit their aggression for fear of retaliation, they were led to believe they were randomly assigned to a no-distraction condition wherein the bogus other person could not have an opportunity to induce harm in any way.
Inhibiting Cue Manipulation
After they tested the coldness of the water, participants in the inhibiting cue condition were told that their recommended immersion duration for their partner would be examined by a second researcher who was interested in reactions to events in the study.  Thus, another person would learn of the participant’s responses. To insure their anonymity, those in the no-inhibiting cue condition were told to make sure they had not signed their name on any of the papers. As a manipulation check for the inhibiting cue, all participants were asked to indicate whether or not others would observe their results after the study was completed.
Cognitive Load Manipulation
Following the inhibition cue manipulation, participants were told that as part of a cognitive task, they would rehearse a number while they decided how long their partner should hold their hand in the water (i.e., while they completed the aggression measure). They were told they would be given 30 seconds to become familiar with a number, which they would rehearse while deciding on the ice-water immersion duration. For those in the high cognitive load condition, the number was ten digits long. For those in the low cognitive load condition, it was only three digits long. This cognitive load manipulation is similar to others successfully employed in previous research (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Pendry & Macrae, 1999). In addition, the participant was told to stop rehearsing the number once they completed the aggression measure.
Aggression
Participants were given a sheet of paper with the number written on it and told they would be asked to write the number at the end of the study. They were given 30 seconds to memorize it. When this time had elapsed, they completed the aggression measure –their decision regarding the duration of the partner’s ice-water immersion. The experimenter left the room as the participant began number rehearsal, just before completing the aggression measure. As previously stated, participants were asked to decide how long the other participant should hold his/her hand in icy water, ostensibly as a distraction while performing another task. Participants circled the amount of time that the other participant should be distracted on a 9-point scale starting at “1 = no distraction at all” which increased by 10 second intervals to “9 = 80 seconds/very strong distraction.” This measure of aggression has been successfully employed in previous research (e.g., Vasquez, 2009, Vasquez et al., 2005). 
Cognitive Load Manipulation Check
To assess whether the cognitive load manipulation successfully reduced cognitive performance, participants were asked to complete a picture-categorization task after they completed the aggression measure. They were told this task was another measure of mental performance. They were given 30 seconds to indicate the correct category for each picture in a series, while rehearsing the same number they were assigned for the decision-making exercise. Below each picture 3 categories were listed. Participants were asked to circle the option that best represented the picture (e.g., a picture of a banana should be in the category fruit, rather than vegetable or dairy, which were the other two categories). The task required them to circle as many correct categories as possible in the 30 seconds while rehearsing the number. After completing the categorization task, participants completed measures assessing their reactions to the provocation and trigger inductions. Then, they were debriefed.  
Results
Manipulation Checks 
	All the participants in the inhibitory cue condition recalled that another person would look at their responses. Thus, those in that condition were aware of the inhibitory information presented to them. 
To check the manipulation of cognitive load, participants completed a picture categorization task. Relative to participants in the low cognitive load condition (M = 11.850, SD = 3.371), those under high cognitive load correctly categorized fewer pictures (M = 8.850, SD = 2.922), t(78) = 4.253, p < .05. This suggests our cognitive load manipulation successfully induced a state of limited processing capacity.
The aggression data were analyzed using a 2 (inhibitory cue: yes/no) x 2 (cognitive load: high/low) between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis revealed main effects of inhibitory cue, F(1, 76) = 4.339, p = .041 and cognitive load F(1, 76) = 23.158  p < .001. These were qualified by the predicted inhibitory cue x cognitive load interaction, F(1, 76) = 7.062, p = .010 (see Figure 1). Analyses of simple effects showed that under low cognitive load, participants who received an inhibitory cue expressed lower levels of aggression (M = 3.000, SD = 1.256) than those who did not (M = 4.650, SD = 1.663), t(38) = 3.540, p = .001, d = 1.130. Under high cognitive load, however, aggression levels in the inhibitory cue condition (M = 5.600, SD = 1.759) were not different from those in the no inhibitory cue condition (M = 5.400, SD = 1.501), t(38) = .387, p >.100, d = .126. Thus, the inhibitory cue decreased aggression under low, but not under high cognitive load. In addition, in the no inhibitory cue conditions, aggression was greater in the high, relative to the low cognitive load condition, but this difference was not significant, t(38) = 1.497, p < .143, d = .474, which parallels previous findings on cognitive load and TDA (see Vasquez, 2009).  
Discussion
Our findings support the hypothesis that cognitive load and inhibitory cues interact to moderate triggered displaced aggression. As predicted, presenting an inhibitory cue (that others would learn about the participants’ aggressive reaction) decreased TDA towards the triggering individual, but only when participants were under low cognitive impairment. We suggest that this occurred because the cue activated social-presentation concerns that motivated participants to appear less aggressive. Under high cognitive load, however, the inhibitory cue failed to decrease aggressive behavior, despite the fact that participants had already become aware of it. Given that all the participants in the inhibitory cue condition remembered the inhibiting information, cognitive load seems to have disrupted the elaboration about its meaning and/or importance, rather than interfered with recalling that others would see the participants’ level of aggression.  In the absence of inhibitory information, the higher absolute magnitude of TDA observed under cognitive load was not reliable.  This replicates the finding by Vasquez (2009) that in the absence of inhibitory information, cognitive load produces a slight, but non-significant increase in the displacement of aggression.
In order to interpret our findings, it is important to note that the biggest effect of cognitive load occurs at the intersection of the motivation to aggress and the motivation to avoid the negative consequences of aggressing (i.e., in participants who have been provoked and triggered, but have received an inhibiting cue). In the TDA paradigm, participants are typically led to believe that their aggressive responses will not be observed by others, with the exception of the experimenter. They are also led to believe that the target of aggression would never know who they are. As a result, participants are more likely to feel free to aggress without negative consequences and likely have little motivation to inhibit retaliatory acts (once they have been provoked and there are not external inhibiting cues), other than their own standards of comport learned through socialization. As we previously argued, cognitive load could increase aggression by interfering with inhibiting cognitions that reflect general norms against unjustified aggression. Our findings, however, showed participants in the high cognitive load/no inhibitory cue condition were only slightly more aggressive than those in the low cognitive load/no inhibitory cue condition, but this difference was not significant. The slight increase in the overall magnitude of aggression observed in the current study, and in Vasquez (2009), may be due to the effect of cognitive load on internal standards of comport against acting aggressively. The effect is likely to be weak because the combination of provocation and trigger are likely to make participants feel justified in retaliating against the target. In other words, participants may have natural reservations about aggressing, but the combination of instigations and lack of externally-induced inhibitions means that cognitive load is unlikely to moderate behavior. In the presence of external inhibitory information, however, although provoked individuals are motivated to aggress and have the opportunity to do so (i.e., are angry, aroused, and about to retaliate), they also recognize a need to reduce levels of aggression in order to maintain a positive image and avoid negative consequences. Making use of such information at the moment of aggressing requires cognitive resources for processing its relevance for the aggressor. Cognitive load can interfere with this process, thereby constraining the effectiveness of inhibitory cues in reducing displaced aggression, even if the information has already been learned. 
These results are important for understanding aggressive behavior for several reasons. One is that they shed light on the parameters within which inhibitory information can impact on aggression. The inhibitory cue we presented to participants was subtle, yet sufficiently salient and motivating to decrease TDA. We demonstrated, however, that the beneficial effects of inhibitory information are likely when the cognitive demands on the aggressor are not high. Indeed, our findings might explain some real-world situations wherein despite the awareness by provoked individuals that aggression or violence is likely to have aversive outcomes for them, they still express high levels of aggressive behavior. These situations can range in context from road rage to instances of domestic violence.
Nevertheless, there may be some conditions under which the effects of cognitive load are themselves disrupted or reversed. For instance, even under cognitive load, highly motivated individuals are likely to engage in deeper processing of cues and information (see Chun & Kruglanski, 2006). As a result, inhibitory cues can be expected to exert their aggression-reducing effects when individuals are motivated to consider the implications of their actions.  In addition, cognitive load and the salience of inhibitory cues may interact, such that the effect of high cognitive load decreases as the salience of inhibitory cues increases. For example, a provoked individual under cognitive load may fail to consider the implications of aggressing in the presence of other people, but if the audience includes police officers looking to make an arrest, the likelihood of inhibiting an aggressive response will increase. As previously stated, our inhibitory cue was likely to have been subtle (though certainly salient enough to have produced the predicted effect), and thus, to have had less influence on behavior in the context of high cognitive load. It may be, however, that exposing participants to more salient inhibiting information would still lead to a decrease in aggression. This is an issue that future research should examine.
Another reason why our findings are important is that they help demonstrate the versatility of cognitive load as a moderator of TDA, and perhaps also direct forms of aggression. Vasquez (2009) showed that cognitive load increases TDA by affecting the processing of instigator cues. In that study, cognitive load increased aggression when the trigger was high in salience. In the current study cognitive load increased aggression by interfering with inhibitory processes. Thus, cognitive load facilitates aggression both by exacerbating the impact of cues that motivate a retaliatory response (Vasquez, 2009), and by interfering with cues that may serve to inhibit it. This suggests that further examination of the role that cognitive load plays in aggression is essential for understanding this type of behavior.
Our research also has implications for understanding the processes through which alcohol impacts aggression. Numerous studies have shown that alcohol tends to increase aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Cooper, 1990; Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996). It is, however, still unclear how alcohol has such an effect. One influential hypothesis, termed alcohol myopia, proposes that this popular drug moderates aggression by decreasing an individual’s ability to process information, including social cues (see Steele & Josephs, 1990). As a result, individuals under the influence find themselves in a state of reduced cognitive processing capacity, which leads them to process primarily the more salient cues and cognitions (hence the myopia) and less able to process information and cognitions that are less salient or require more mental elaboration. With regards to aggression, instigations are relatively salient cues that activate a motivation to retaliate, and they are often attended to and processed by individuals under the influence. If, however, inhibitory cues or cognitions are less salient or require more processing capacity to influence behavior, then the reduced processing capacity induced by alcohol is likely to interfere with their ability to inhibit aggression. The effects of our manipulation of cognitive load on the ability to process cues are likely to parallel those of alcohol intoxication. Thus, we would expect that replacing cognitive load with alcohol would have a similar effect on provoked and triggered participants who were exposed to the inhibitory cue. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that alcohol increases aggression by reducing the ability to process less salient social information or extract meaning from it, even in when inhibitory cues normally decrease it. 
It is important to note that cognitive load and alcohol intoxication are not interchangeable. Alcohol can induce a number of effects on the nervous system that cognitive load does not. For instance, alcohol can increase aggression by activating expectancies or beliefs that associate alcohol and aggression, even in the absence of consumption, by merely exposing individuals to alcohol-related information or cues (Friedman, McCarthy, Bartholow, & Hicks, 2007; Pedersen, Vasquez, Bartholow, Grosvenor, & Truong, 2014). The activation of alcohol-aggression association in long term memory can increase perceptions of hostility in ambiguous, yet somewhat negative interactions, which subsequently motivate higher levels of retaliation (Pedersen et al., 2014). Nevertheless, cognitive load may be useful for testing some aspects of the link between alcohol and aggressive behavior, particularly when ethical concerns (e.g., required alcohol dosage is unacceptably high) or pragmatic issues might preclude the administration of alcohol. 
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Figure 1. Aggression as a function of cognitive load and inhibitory cue.






